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I. INTRODUCTION
New ideas, technologies, innovative products and other efforts
of human creativity are considered intellectual property. The
importance of development and use of products embodying
intellectual property has increased dramatically. The growing share
of knowledge-intensive products in worldwide trade together with
the increase in international technological competition, copying
devices, and integrated communication abilities have magnified the
economic significance of intellectual property.1
In an effort to protect intellectual property creations, many
countries devise regimes which govern the ownership and use of
intellectual property. Copyright laws,2 patent laws,3 trade secrets,4
1. Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GAT A Kew From the
South, 22 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L 243, 254 (1989) [hereinafter Braga].
2. "'Copyright laws protect the representation of ideas, namely literary and artistic works from
unauthorized distribution or publication. A copyright automatically exists upon authorship of works,
such as books, recordings, and more recently, computer programs. Copyrights are transferable and
allow the owner to extract a fee, or royalty, for reproduction or performance of the copyrighted work.
The duration of the protection is typically fifty years after the author's death or, in cases where there
is no author, fifty years after original publication." Heritage Foundation, New Threats to Intellectual
Property Rights, 761 BACKOROuNDER 3 (1990) [hereinafter New Threats].
3. Id at 4. "A patent is a government's legal guarantee that the patented invention can be
produced, sold, utilized, or imported only with the explicit authorization of the patent holder. Patents
are granted for inventions that are new and commercially useful." Id
4. Id. "Trade secrets am usually protected by contractual agreements and are used largely for
ideas or inventions too sensitive to be patented, since patents requires disclosure of creative product
or idea to the government granting the patent." Id
348
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and trademarks 5 grant innovators supreme rights to their creations
for a specified period of time.6 The specified period of exclusivity
allows innovators and creators time to earn a return on the time
and money invested in developing their ideas. The monetary return
is needed to replenish funds expended and provide a chance to
profit. Intellectual property regimes, in theory, include provisions
that protect the creators and manufacturers against the abuse of
their rights and allow intellectual property developers time for
monetary recovery.7 However, if the protection of the intellectual
property regimes is inadequate or ignored, the inventors and
developers are unable to achieve the return necessary to encourage
continued innovation and creativity.
Consequently, intellectual property and its protection have
become fundamental to the growth and stability of many countries.
Developed and developing countries alike recognize intellectual
property as becoming a factor that distinguishes the prosperous and
strong nations from the weak ones.8 This economic significance of
intellectual property, particularly its growing impact on trade, is the
focus of many studies and has sparked debates among the countries
of the world.9
First, Part II highlights the growing ineffectiveness of current
intellectual property protections, and discuss the detrimental
consequences of continued ineffectiveness. This comment then
explains why measures presently available to correct the problem
are inadequate. Part III subsequently endorses the application of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the more
efficient and proper means available to curb the inadequacies of
5. Id "Trademarks are any sign, word, design, letter, number, color, or shape that
distinguishes one product from another. The shape of a Coca-Cola bottle, as well as the name, is a
trademark." Id
6. For example, patents secure to an inventor for a term of years the exclusive right to make,
use, or sell an invention. WEBSmmR's THIRD WORLD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1654
(unabridged 1981).
7. Greenwald, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the GATT and the Uruguay
Round: The US Viewpoint, in CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION IN US-EC TRADE RELATIONS AT THE
OPENING OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 239 (Rubin & Jones ed. 1989) [hereinafter Greenwald].
8. Braga, supra note 1, at 254.
9. Id.
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current intellectual property protection.'" This paper focuses on
the instruments within GATT, its willingness to deal with the
unfair trade issue, and the recent attempt by signatories to reach a
GATT agreement. Integrated throughout, the comment discusses the
conflict between developed and developing countries which
disagree on the appropriateness of increasing intellectual property
protection. This comment concludes that an effective multi-national
intellectual property agreement under GATT is possible, but only
if developing countries secure a better chance to be heard.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTIONS
PROBLEMS & EFFECTS
A. Developed Countries
1. Developed Countries' View of the Problem
With the ever-increasing costs of product innovation, creation,
and marketing, the recovery of expenses is essential for developing
the next generation of products and services. Many industrialized
countries claim that an economic return commensurate with the
costs expended by companies and individuals is more difficult to
achieve today." They maintain that competitors, who do not face
similar developmental expenses, copy and sell the product at a
much lower cost.'2 Industrialized countries declare that this on-
going encroachment, or frustration of intellectual property rights is
unfair, because it effectively displaces legitimately produced works
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GAT].
11. Statement of Views of the European, Japanese and United States Business Communities,
Basic Framework of GA7TProvisions on Intellectual Property, Feb. 11, 1988, ICC Doe. No. 450/623
Rev. 2, in GAIT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 357, 363 (Beier & Sehricker ed. 1989) [hereinafter Statement of Views].
12. See id. Looking at Thailand's market as an example, "the price of a video copied
legitimately is around 300 baht including a copyright fee of between 60 and 70 baht, while a street-
side pirated version costs about 150 baht - or less in bulk." Financial Times, Dec. 6, 1990, at 3, col.
8. Bahl is the basic monetary unit of Thailand. See WEasTER's THIRD WORLD NEw INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 168, 1458 (unabridged 1981).
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from international markets.1 3 Many countries point to inadequate
protection of and compliance with intellectual property rights as the
main factor compounding this inequity.
2. Effects of Ineffective Protection
Developed countries report that ineffective intellectual property
protection has resulted in extensive and increasing erosion of their
markets and profits. Deficient protection adversely affects the U.S.;
a deep concern has grown out of its lost competitiveness in world
markets as evidenced in the report Global Competition-The New
Reality, submitted in October 1984 to President Reagan.1 4 The
study reveals that the U.S. lead in high technology is declining. It
professes that high technology innovations are the only means to
maintain the market position that the U.S. industry holds
worldwide. Improved protection of domestic and international
intellectual property constitutes a necessary support towards this
end.
The injury to worldwide industry as a result of ineffective
protection of intellectual property is compelling evidence of the
magnitude of the problem. This injury is often illustrated by figures
representing lost sales, jobs and earnings. In response to a recent
questionnaireof the U.S. International Trade Commission, 193 U.S.
firms estimated their aggregate worldwide losses due to inadequate
intellectual property protection at $23.8 billion in 1986 or 2.7% of
sales affected by intellectual property. 5 Estimates of worldwide
losses to all of U.S. industry in 1986 from inadequate foreign
protection of intellectual property range from $43 billion to $61
billion. 6 Losses to industries dealing in U.S. movies, music
works, books, and software are estimated to be $4.17 billion in
1990.17 Outside of the U.S., a study by a panel of U.S., European
13. Statement of Views, supra note 11, at 363.
14. President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness in GLoBAL COMPmEImoN-THE NmW
REALrrY (1985).
15. See Statement of Views, supra note 11, at 362. See also New Threats, supra note 2, at 6.
16. IL
17. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 274 (Feb. 20, 1991).
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and Japanese industries reports an average of 100,000 jobs a year
are lost in Britain alone due to patent and copyright violations."8
The European Parliament estimated that losses sustained by British
publishers from copyright infringements average about $216
million a year.19 Additionally, the U.S., European and Japanese
business communities complain that a disproportionate amount of
time and resources are spent defending intellectual property owners
and their rights.2" As a result, there is a growing consensus among
many nations that the inequitable invasion of innovators' rights is
not simply a problem of intellectual property, but has substantially
distorted worldwide trade.2" Consequently, a key issue in
international discussions is the protection of intellectual property
and its trade-related aspects.
B. Developing Countries
1. Developing Countries' View of the Problem
Many developing countries do not share the view that the
protection of intellectual property rights is both economically sound
and necessary to alleviate distortion in world trade.22 The
economic objective of developing countries is to promote
participation in the benefits from technological developments and
scientific innovations on terms consistent with their needs and
ideologies.23 Developing countries consider the free flow of
technology to be essential to their economic development.
Therefore, they oppose action which might in any way impede the
movement of technology, or of products based on foreign
18. Statement of Views, supra note 11, at 362. See generally New Threats, supra note 2, at 6
(discussing costs of inadequate intellectual property protection).
19. Financial Times, Dec. 1, 1988, at 5.
20. Statement of Views, supra note 11, at 361.
21. ld.
22. New Threats, supra note 2, at 2.
23. Yelpaala, Third World Perspective on Technology Transfer, in LIC ,sINO AGREEMENT.
PATENTS, KNow-How, TRADE SECRETS AND SoFrwARE 207 (1988) [hereinafter Yelpaala, Third
World].
352
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technology or innovation.24 Furthermore, some third world
countries insist that knowledge and intellectual property are "the
common heritage of mankind" or "res communis, "25 and
therefore, society may not impose any restrictions on the
production, use or selling of inventions."' Rather, ideas,
inventions, and technologies should be freely shared by all.
2. Effects
Despite these views, developing countries are strongly urged to
join the general consensus in improving intellectual property
protections since they too risk injury in the long term. Without
adequate protections, industries are reluctant to commit to the
development of the next generation of products, processes, and
services in those countries.27 This diminution in commitment
results in the loss of new jobs, skills, and foreign investments that
innovative firms supply.28 Additionally, the loss of foreign
investment prevents countries from attaining their own new
research, development facilities, and manufacturing plants.29
Il. SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION
A. Past Proposed Solutions
Recognizing the injury caused by intellectual property right
abuses, many countries are searching for a prompt, efficient and
fair solution to the inadequacy of current intellectual property
24. Greenwald, supra note 7, at 238.
25. See New Threats, supra note 2, at 2. See also Yelpaala, Third Worl, supra note 23, at 233
(providing a definition of res communis).
26. Yelpaala, Third World, supra note 23, at 233. Additionally, to those underdeveloped
countries that are marxist, communist and socialist, the concept of property is the antithesis of their
view to abolishing private ownership. See id. at 227-28.
27. New Threats, supra note 2, at 6.
28. Id. at 5. See 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1306 (Aug. 22, 1990). "Without these
laws, there's no incentive to do research and development [in developing nations]," stated Harvey
Bale, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association senior vice-president of international affairs. Id.
29. Statement of Views, supra note 11, at 363. See generally New Threats, supra note 2, at 5
(discussing potential investors' attraction to improved intellectual property).
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protection. Past solutions accent improving municipal and customs
laws in individual countries and existing multiparty organizations
and conventions, such as the Paris Convention for Protection of
Industrial Property,3" or the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works.3" Unfortunately, these particular
avenues have proven inefficient in tackling the complexity of the
issues at hand.
1. Municipal Laws
The argument that improving municipal laws will help secure
intellectual property rights is founded on the related notions of
"National Treatment" (NT). NT, as implemented in the Paris
Convention for Protection of Industrial Property, 32  requires
signatory countries to treat individuals from a foreign country as
they treat their own nationals. 33 Thus, a host country is obligated
to give foreign visitors, and their property the same protection that
its municipal laws give to its own citizens.
However, shortcomings of applying NT become obvious if the
applicable municipal laws are themselves insufficient.34 For
example, the Paris Convention grants each signatory country the
right to determine what is patentable. This means that each country
creates its own specific intellectual property regime.) Thus,
countries wAth the res communis ideology36 have flexibility under
the Paris Convention to enact very limited or even no laws
30. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as revised
at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter
Paris Convention] (recognizing the standards of patentability).
31. Berne Convention for the Protection of literary and Artistic Works, September 9,1886,828
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (existing as one of the oldest and most prominent
treaties protecting copyrights). The U.S. became a party to the Convention March 1, 1989, H.R. Doc.
No. 609, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988).
32. Paris Convention, supra note 30.
33. Yelpaala, Third World, supra note 23, at 232.
34. Fikentscher, GA7T Principles and Intellectual Property Protection, in GATT OR WIPO?
NEw WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 99, 114-15 (Beier &
Schricker ed. 1989) [hereinafter Fikentscher].
35. Yelpaala, Third World, supra note 23, at 237.
36. See id. at 223.
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recognizing patentability.37 Consequently, NT creates a disparate
level of protection in different countries. It does not ensure
substantive equivalence. Thus, according to NT principles, a
country with a high level of protection must grant this higher
protection even to foreigners of countries with a lower level of
protection. However, when citizens from the country with a higher
level of protection visit the country with a lower level of
protection, they must settle for the lower protection of that
country." In many situations, NT only provides a foreigner with
inadequate protection from the host country's municipal laws.39
Thus, municipal law coupled with NT does not offer an effective
solution to the distortions of intellectual property trade.
2. Customs Laws
Customs laws, which regulate the flow of goods over borders,
could help limit the circulation of unfairly obtained products into
some countries. The attempt to use customs laws, similar to the
attempt to use municipal laws, is effective only if adequate laws
uniformly exist. However, since most countries are free to set their
own border regulations, countries desiring free flow across their
borders are able to set minimum restrictions. This leads to disparate
levels of protection between countries. Even if created or improved,
customs laws alone do not solve the problem if infringements
originate within the country's borders.
37. Id. at 237.
38. Katzenberger, General Principles of the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, in
GAIT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTEuEcruAL PROPERTY 45
(Beier & Schricker ed. 1989) [hereinafter Katzenberger].
39. Statement of Views, supra note 11, at 363.
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3. Multiparty Organizations & Conventions
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a
specialized U.N. organization, has been for many years the only
source of regulatory movement in intellectual property rights.4"
WIPO is the custodian of international conventions, like the Berne
Convention41 (copyrights), the Paris Convention 2 (patents), and
the Madrid and Lisbon Agreements43 (false source repression on
goods, and protection of title of origin).' WIPO administers the
Paris Convention which contributes to the level of intellectual
property protection available today.4"
However, this agency has fallen short of meeting intellectual
property protection needs, especially in recent years. The extensive
losses experienced by signatory countries confirm the
inadequacy.4" Signatories to the WIPO-administered conventions
are bound to merely provide NT, which is branded ineffective. In
addition, the obligation to grant NT established by the Paris
Convention is interpreted by the signatories as precisely defined
and closed.47 Therefore, under WIPO, the treaty obligation to
provide NT cannot extend to new objects of intellectual property
not specifically mentioned.48
40. Art. 4 of the Convention Establishing World Intellectual Property Organization, July 19,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.$. No. 6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
41. See Berne Convention, supra note 31.
42. See Paris Convention, supra note 30.
43. Madrid, Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks of April 14, 1891,
as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389,201 W.I.P.O. 1983; Lisbon Agreement
for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration of October 31, 1958,
as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 264 W.I.P.O. 1976.
44. Braga, supra note 1, at 250.
45. Kretschmer, The Present Position of The US, Japanese and European Industry, in GATI
OR WIPO? NEw WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93, 96
(Beier & Schricker ed. 1989) [hereinafter Krctschmer].
46. See supra, notes 22-29 and accompanying text discussing developing countries and the
effects of ineffective protection.
47. Kunz-Halstein, The US Proposalfor a GATT-Agreenent on Intellectual Property and The
Paris Convention for the Protection ofIndustrial Property, in GATr OR WIPO? Nw WAYS IN THE
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In addition, some signatories believe that dealing with
significant shortcomings of municipal laws or their improper
application is beyond WIPO's mandate.49 Thus, if a country does
not have a law protecting intellectual property rights, or if an
existing law does not cover a certain technology, the Paris
Convention cannot be used to force the creation of a protective
law. Countries have already experienced difficulties in
characterizing new technologies under the existing types of
intellectual protection. Complications occur when new products are
introduced, illustrated by the great difficulties that followed the
developments of computer software and the semi-conductor
chip.50
Developed countries also argue that even if the rules themselves
provide sufficient protection, there is still no method of
enforcement under WIPO or its conventions. Many argue that the
most significant deficiency in the WIPO process is the absence of
a meaningful system enforcing minimum standards of intellectual
property protection.5 1 This inadequacy impedes any existing
protective treaty or convention.
Thus, the available avenues of national law, customs law, and
the multiparty conventions that currently touch upon intellectual
property do not effectively solve the growing unfairness of
intellectual property trade. Not all countries have the same notion
of proprietary rights and not all signatories have the same
interpretation of their obligations. Even a more fundamental
problem is that not all countries subscribe to WIPO or all of the
conventions. Thus, these countries remain free of the convention
rules that do persist. These ineffective alternatives to the problem
have led many countries to create temporary solutions.
49. Kretschmer, supra note 45, at 96.
50. A wholly new intellectual property protection was created between the U.S., Japan, Sweden
and the European Community due to the development of the semi-conductor chip. See Gadbaw &
Richards, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIoHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CoNLIcr? 5 (1988)
[hereinafter GLOBAL CONSENSUS].
51. Kastenmeier & Beier, International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and
Reality, 22 VANDJ. TRANSNAT. L. 285, 293 n.24 (1989).
357
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B. Temporary Solutions
Frustrated by the deficiency of available solutions, governments
across the globe are opting for unilateral remedies in order to
eliminate trade distortions caused by inadequate protection of
intellectual property. 2 As tariff walls have tumbled down through
international negotiations, other less visible forms of protection
have taken their place.5 3 The U.S., as one example, has enacted
several pieces of legislation such as The Trade and Tariff Act.
4
This act enables the President to consider the protection another
nation affords to intellectual property when determining whether
the foreign nation's actions are "unreasonable" for purposes of
Section 301 of the Trade and Tariff Act (retaliation) or when
determining a nation's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
standing.55 The European Community (EC) offers another example
of unilateral movement. The EC has withdrawn GSP privileges and
initiated proceedings under its commercial rules against Indonesia
for record piracy. 6 Such measures often lead to bilateral
negotiations between two countries at the opposite ends of the
unilateral movement. Some of the bilateral negotiations are
relatively successful in gaining improved intellectual property
52. See GATT7 BRIEF: The American Connection, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 1990, at 85-86
[hereinafter American Connection].
53. Id at 85.
54. 19 U.S.C. § 241 I(e)(4)(B) (1988). "Section 301 provides the President with the authority
to seek the elimination of a nation's unjustifiable or unreasonable trade practices, where such
practices burden United States commerce and authorizes the restriction of imports from that nation
if such practices are not eliminated." GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 50, at 6 n.8.
55. See Financial Times, Dec. 6, 1990. at 3, col. 8. (discussing the International Intellectual
Property Alliance's filing of a Section 301 petition in late 1990 seeking an investigation and possible
retaliation of alleged copyright abuses in Thailand). For example, the U.S., dissatisfied with ongoing
piracy in several south east Asian countries, did not wait for the problem to be solved under the
international treatment principle of the Berne or UC Convention and turned to domestic trade
sanctions. "The results were . .. 'amazing.' Within a relatively short time, Taiwan, Malaysia,
Singapore, and South Korea enacted or amended general copyright legislation." Dreier, National
Treatment, Reciprocity and Retorsion-The Case of Computer Programs and Integrated Circuits, in
GAT OR WIPO? NEw WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECON OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 63,
68 (Beier & Schricker ed. 1989).
56. Statement of Views, supra note I1, at 364.
358
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protection, especially for developed countries." However, each
accomplishment resulting from bilateral talks raises other
frustrations.
Although industrialized countries prefer unilateral actions to no
protection improvements at all, both developed and developing
countries have their own reasons for disliking this unilateral
approach. Both developed and developing countries agree it is an
imperfect solution. Developed countries hesitate in using these
methods because they fear that a hard-won victory with one nation
under one bilateral negotiation sets the limits for future negotiations
with another country.5" Furthermore, other countries may take
advantage of the successful outcome of improved protection only
after the concessions by the negotiators are granted.59 These
limitations of the approach have forced policymakers, particularly
those in the United States, to search for an answer in a new
multilateral convention. Developing countries have continued to
oppose addressing intellectual property rights, services, or even
trade-related investment issues in the context of a multilateral
convention. Despite this reluctance, developing countries, which do
not stand with equal bargaining power, will be the most
disadvantaged if developed countries continue to lead the rest of
the world into a more tightly-managed set of bilateral trade
relationships.' U.S. trade officials admonished that "until
adequate international rules exist for the $1 trillion of trade that
now goes undisciplined... [their government] will continue to use
sanctions or the threat of sanctions . ,,6. If the countries of the
world do not reach a solution, these initiatives to protect
intellectual property could become the norm and result in new
barriers to legitimate trade.62
57. See GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 50, at 23 n.22. The Republic of Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan (three of the top five GSP beneficiary nationals under the U.S.) have all made genuine efforts
to provide a greater level of intellectual property protection. Mexico was poised to provide
significantly improved patent protection. Id.
58. I at 29.
59. Id
60. Id at 48-49.
61. American Connection, supra note 52, at 86.
62. Statement of Views, supra note 11, at 364.
359
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
C. Finding a Real Solution: GAIT
In the hope of finding an efficient multilateral convention to
solve the intellectual property protection deficiency, both developed
and developing nations have turned to GATT. After World War II,
an international contingency attempted to establish a specialized
agency of the U.N. which would provide institutional machinery
designed to "reconstitute the pre-war economic and monetary
system with due safeguards against the defects which had militated
against free trade." 63 The agency was to be named the
International Trade Organization (ITO). Disagreements prevented
ITO's formation, but as a result of those unsuccessful efforts,
GATT was created.' GATT took effect on January 1, 1948,65
and "provides treaty mechanisms for the establishment and the
maintenance of a common code of conduct for international
trade." It provides machinery for the stabilization and the
progressive reduction of tariffs, and a forum for regular
consultation and periodic negotiating rounds between its
participants. GATT also supplies a structure and procedure for the
conciliation and settlement of disputes so as to protect and secure
a balance of interests between contracting parties.67 The
agreement remains the most comprehensive instrument of
international law regulating international trade.6 Consequently,
many countries believe that GATT is a viable means to attaining
effective intellectual property protection.
63. K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GA'IT, IV. 1 (1989).
64. Id See generally Fikentscher, supra note 34, at 101-02 (discussing GATI's creation).
65. Id.
66. SIMMONDS & HILL, supra note 63, at 1-2.
67. Fikentscher, supra note 34, at 101.
68. Id.
360
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1. Quieting Potential Problems
a. GAYT Compatibility with IPP
GATT currently makes few references to intellectual property.
As negotiated in the 1940s, GATT only contained two provisions
involving intellectual property: Article IX,' which discusses
"marks of origin" and Article XX,7" which mentions patents and
copyrights in discussing measures for securing compliance.7"
Consequently, one eminent question is whether the framework of
rules and negotiating procedures of GATT can be applied to the
improvement and protection of intellectual property rights. The
answer experts most often espouse is that GATT is primarily a
contract among its members, and, as a contract, it can be extended
to cover anything its members choose.72 Further, GATT rules
already allow member nations to protect intellectual property rights
at their borders."
Underlying GATT is a guarantee of free and undistorted trade.
The proponents of intellectual property protection do not seek a
granting of rights. Rather, they seek distortion-free trade of
recognized goods. Arguably, intellectual property is like any other
tradeable good. It has its own intrinsic value. The difference is
intellectual property represents the "commodity of ideas." 74
Under GATT, if a consensus exists that the failure to protect
intellectual property rights is distorting the patterns of international
69. See SIMMONDS & HiLL, supra note 63, at 1-2. -Article IX covers marks of origin and is
designed to deal with country of origin mislabeling and abuse of marking requirements." Id.
70. Id, GATT Article XX(d) provides in relevant part that "nothing in the Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of measures ... necessary to secure compliance
with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including
... the protection of patents, trademarks, and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices."
See GAIT, supra note 10.
71. Statement of Views, supra note 11, at 365.
72. GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 50, at 43. "'There is no inherent institutional reason why
the GAT cannot take up the issue of intellectual property rights for the purpose of elaborating rules
that reduce or eliminate the distortions caused by the lack of protection or lack of coordinated
international enforcement." Id.
73. Id See GAIT, supra note 10, at art. XX(d).
74. Yelpaala, Third World, supra note 23, at 223.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
trade, members may clarify and expand GATT rules to deal with
the problem at its source, namely the intellectual property
regimes.75 GATT, therefore, provides the opportunity to evaluate
intellectual property protection not simply as a technical legal
question, but as an economic trade issue. The agreement places
intellectual property in the context of trade concessions: countries
exchange access to their markets for access to the markets of
others. 76
b. Contractual Nature of GATT
GATT puts intellectual property regulation entirely into a
negotiating process: to obtain concessions from one GATT member
the receiver offers something in return.*" In light of this
arrangement, some developing countries complain that they are
asked to make new concessions in the area of intellectual property
without receiving anything in return. However, U.S. and other
countries counter such complaints by invoking Article XXIII of
GATT. 78
75. GLOBAL CONSENSUs, supra note 50, at 43.
76. Id. at 52.
77. Gadbaw, Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or Marriage of
Convenience?, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 230 (1989).
78. GAIT Article XXIII, Nullification or Impairment, reads in part:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to
it directly under this Agreement is nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the
result of (a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another
contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the
provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of
the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other
contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration
to the representations or proposals made to it. 2. If no satisfactory
adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within
a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in
paragraph 1(c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES ....
Atlantic Council of the United States, GATr PLUS-A PROPOSAL FOR TRADE REFORM wITH THE
TExT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT 137-38 (1975) [hereinafter GAIT PLUS].
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Article XXIII permits a contracting party to claim a nullification
or impairment of rights as a result of either a violation of GATT
or any other measure that has the effect of denying a party the
rights for which it has bargained.79 Developed countries argue that
all GATT negotiations are based on the expectation that the value
of their past concessions would not be undermined."0 Clearly, if
continued abuse of intellectual property rights were not within
reasonable expectations of the party, the value of the concessions
would be seriously impaired. Developed countries further support
the impairment stance by pointing out that in original GATT
negotiations only a nominal percentage of exports were tied to
intellectual property. 1 Overall, the volume of world trade in
goods has grown ten-fold since GATT's conception "rising by 6%
a year since 1983. ,82 Industrialized countries use these
percentages to show complaining members that interests and
expectations are changing on both sides of the table. Consequently,
developed countries believe these impairments, not taken into
account originally, are a form of concession they can use in current
negotiations.
2. The Instruments of GATT
The instruments available within GATT may aid in obtaining a
solution in the area of trade-related aspects of intellectual property
protection (TRIPs). In particular, the tools used to reach fair and
efficient results are the broad framework of GATT and its theories
of the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) and National Treatment.
a. Broader Framework
Having focused their discussions solely on intellectual property,
WIPO members have attained minimal results. Under GATT,
79. Gadbaw, supra note 77, at 231.
80. IM. at 232.
81. See i. (stating that less than ten percent of U.S. exports were tied to intellectual property
when GAIT emerged).
82. American Connection, supra note 52, at 85.
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countries negotiate problems in the broader context of "trade
policy." This broader framework improves the chances for success,
since it allows trade-offs and leverage situations.83 Intellectual
property is just one of fifteen areas recently reviewed.84 Since
countries negotiate for items, such as agriculture and textiles, in
addition to intellectual property protections, countries may be
willing to make concessions in the area of intellectual property for
other gains. The variety of items negotiated enhances the chance of
reaching compromises, and subsequently a solution.85 As a result,
developing countries as well as the developed countries are more
likely to conclude negotiations believing that a fair result has been
obtained.
However, this broader context of negotiations may have its
disadvantages. In order for a GATT Round to effectively conclude,
parties contend that agreement must be reached in all the areas of
negotiations. Therefore, although the parties may agree as to
intellectual property protections, they may reach a stalemate over
another item, like agriculture or antidumping. A stalemate in one
area of the GATT Rounds may risk the success of the whole
Round, and any accomplishments in intellectual property
protections negotiations.86
83. Kretschmer, supra note 45, at 96.
84. The fifteen items of the Uruguay Round include: intellectual property; agriculture; textiles
and clothing; natural resource-based products; services; tropical products; disputes settlement;
investment measures; tariff; non-tariff measures; subsidies and countervailing measures; safeguards;
GAIT codes; GAIT articles; and functioning of the GAITsystem. SeeAmerican Connection, supra
note 52, at 86.
85. Joos & Moufang, Report on the Second-Ringberg Symposium, in GATr OR WIPO? N w
WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTiON OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 25 (Beier & Schricker
ed. 1989).
86. The ministerial meeting in Brussels of early December 1990 was supposed to finalize the
four-year Uruguay Round efforts. However, the U.S. and European Community failed to agree on
a reduction in farm subsidies. As a result, the whole GAIT effort, including the labor of the other
14 areas, temporarily stalled. See Financial Times, Jan. 15, 1991, Survey §, at 11. See also infra note
97 and accompanying text (discussing recent developments in overcoming farming disagreements).
364
1991 / GATT: Intellectual Property Rights Solution
b. Most-Favored-Nation Combined with National Treatment
Another attribute of GATT is its juxtaposition of Most-Favored-
Nation with National Treatment. MFN and NT complement each
other as devices for assuring free world trade. Under M%4FN," any
advantage granted by a GATT Contracting Party to any other
country must be granted to all GATT Contracting Parties.88 Thus,
MFN provides equal treatment for all international trading parties
so designated. 9 The MFN clause requires a government to treat
all foreign goods equally, but domestic goods might be favored.
NT prevents this discrimination between domestic and foreign
products." NT binds the Contracting Party to treat foreign
imported goods as if they were domestic goods. Thus, NT is the
87. See GATT Article I, General-Most-Favored Nation Treatment stating:
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation ... any advantage, favor, privilege
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties.
GATT PLUs, supra note 78, at 100.
88. Fikentscher, supra note 34, at 114. "Most-favored-nation treatment is a special application
of the even broader principle of non-discrimination: If an act of discrimination should be committed
against a commercial partner of a GAT Contracting Party, this Party is bound, under the
international law of the GAT Agreement, to remedy this discrimination, if the affected partner is
another GATT Contracting Party." Id. The other GAT principles, such as anti-dumping measures
and subsidies control can be derived from the MFN treatment. Id. at 103.
89. Id. at 103.
90. GATT Article Ill, National Treatment states:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges,
and laws, regulations, and requirements affect the internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified
amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products
so as to afford protection to domestic products ....
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations,
and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use ....
GAT PLUS, supra note 78, at 104.
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necessary counterpart to MFN treatment. 9' Together, both
principles maximize free world trade by tentatively creating
identical market conditions, irrespective of national boundaries."
I
c. Codes
Another special feature of GATT is the procedural ability of
members to form a lateral agreement aside from a general GATT
resolution when countries cannot unanimously agree on an issue.
This separate agreement is termed a code. A code format provides
interested parties with an opportunity to form a separate, more
detailed agreement in combination with, or in lieu of, a less
demanding agreement. Countries participate in establishing a code
voluntarily, so only members that sign a particular code are held to
the stricter standards that it might contain.93
d. GATT's Willingness to Deal with Unfair Trade
GATT's tools of a broader framework, the combination of MFN
and NT and codes bring hope to the search for a solution to the
intellectual property debate. Because GATT has successfully
eliminated many tariffs hindering trade, its members increasingly
turn their attention to "nontariff barriers" to trade. Referring to all
forms of governmental intervention other than the ordinary tariff,
nontariff barriers are designed to tip the scales of international
competition in favor of the domestic consumer or producer."'
Nontariff 1arriers include the unilateral and bilateral steps that the
industrialized countries take to quash intellectual property right
encroachments. Focusing on nontariff barriers has expanded the
scope of GATT's work into domains previously reserved to
domestic policy-making.95
91. In comparison, the conventions under WIPO lack this important combination.
92. Fikentscher, supra note 34, at 114-15.
93. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1306-07 (Aug. 22, 1990).
94. GATT PLUS, supra note 78, at 45.
95. GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 50, at 29.
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Since unilateral and bilateral movement are inherently unfair to
developing countries which have little power in this area, GATT
discourages these efforts. These activities also establish new
regimes that favor only a few countries. This effect is contrary to
GATT's goal of distortion-free trade. Consequently, since many
find the current status of intellectual property protection leading to
unfair trade results, and even more agree that growing nontariff
barriers are detrimental to free trade, GAT members are willing
to tackle the issue of intellectual property.
D. The Current GATT Round
Frustrated by the ineffectiveness of the conventions under WIPO
to resolve the intellectual property issues, and realizing that GAT
may be the answer for improving intellectual property protection,
GATT members have included the issue of intellectual property in
the latest GAIT Round, the "Uruguay Round."" Signed in 1986,
the "Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round," authorizes
a GAIT committee to deal with trade-related aspects of intellectual
property.97 Trade ministers of 100 member countries, and seven
aspirants, participate in this four year-old negotiation effort. These
96. The Uruguay Round is named after the 1986 opening conference held in Puntal del Este,
Uruguay.
97. The Declaration states:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade, and
taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of
intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade,
the negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate
new rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles, rule
and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, taking into
account work already undertaken in GAIT. These negotiations shall be without
prejudice to other complementary initiative that may be taken in the World
Intellectual Property Organization and elsewhere to deal with these matters.
GAT, Ministerial Declaration of Punta Del Este, of Sept. 20, 1986, reprinted in LAW AD PRACTICE
UNDER GAT I L.A.3. (K. Simmonds & B. Hill eds. 1988).
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ministers met recently in December 1990 in Brussels in an
unsuccessful attempt to conclude this Round.98
1. Developing Countries and GAYT
Developing countries had no unified position at the
commencement of the new Round. Many developing countries,
including those comprising the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), appeared willing to enter into negotiations."
While some nations demonstrate a willingness to include
intellectual property in GAIT discussions, they argue that the end
product should reflect the developmental differences of their
various countries."te Other nations, whose intellectual property
laws are generally adequate, wish to include in the standard-setting
exercise as many GATT signatory parties as possible, even if this
means lower intellectual property standards.1"'
A minority of developing countries, however, resisted the
initiation of the new Round. These developing countries, led by
Brazil and India, have been reluctant to join in the intellectual
property protection efforts for a number of reasons.1°2 Many
developing countries challenge the industrialized nations' view that
a GATT solution will also benefit developing countries. Developing
98. See Financial Times, Dec. 8, 1990, at 1, col. 3. The December conference broke down after
the Eurpoean Commission refused to meet demands from the U.S. and other nations in the area of
agriculture. However, disagreement continued in the area of intellectual property as well. Id
At the concluding session in December 1990, the ministers appointed Arthur Dunkel, director-
general of GATT, who for weeks following the stall brokered numerous transatlantic discussions. The
Uruguay Round was officially resurrected on February 20, 1991, when the European Commission
finally agreed to demands of the US and others nations to negotiate '*specific binding commitments."
However, aware of the repeated failure to meet deadlines, Dunkel has been hesitant in setting any
target date for completing this Round. See Williams, GATT Talks Given the Kiss of Life,
Independent, Feb. 21, 1991, bus. sec. at 26 (LEXIS, Nexis file).
In the meantime, India is planning to host a conference for developing countries before the
next ministerial meeting. The meeting is an attempt to evolve a common strategy on trade-related
issues, like intellectual property. See Financial Times, Dec. 11, 1990, at 6.
99. Koh, The GA TTand the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Developing
Nation Perspective, in CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION IN US-EC TRADE RELATIONS AT THE OPENING
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 47, 50 (Rubin & Jones ed. 1989).
100.Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 51, at 292.
101. Id.
102. Braga, supra note I, at 259.
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countries point out that if a resolution is passed in GATT that
increases intellectual property protections they will face new
royalties combined with the loss of the perceived benefit of having
access to technology in the least expensive way."0 3 Therefore,
many developing countries oppose increasing intellectual property
protection. However, studies"°  show that even though a
developing nation stands to lose a sizable base of piracy and
infringement revenue, the long term benefits0 5 of having
heightened intellectual property protection outweigh the short-term
economic costs."° As a result, nations have recently shifted
toward increased intellectual property protection and can attest to
outweighing long term benefits."0 7
Developing countries advance other arguments against GATT
efforts on intellectual property. Many developing countries initially
advocated WIPO, not GATT, as the standard-setting arena for
intellectual property. This bias for WIPO stems from the belief that
it is a more sympathetic forum for developing countries.08 In
WIPO as in other United Nations agencies, each country has one
vote and decisions are made by a simply majority. °9 The Third
World's overwhelming majority in WIPO allows them to prescribe
their views for the industrial world's minority bloc. By contrast,
GATT decisions are typically made by consensus."0 Developing
countries are weary of GATT. They have characterized GATT as
a "rich man's club," which serves the interests of developed
countries only."' Kindled by the inherent imbalance of power
103. Id.
104. See generally GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 50, at 105-07.
105. New Threats, supra note 2, at 4-5 (discussing many potential benefits for developing
countries if intellectual property protection is improved).
106. GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 50, at 90.
107. Id at 107. In a study of seven developing countries, it was concluded that very moderate
increases in growth rates (.07% to .2%) would be enough to offset the short term cost contributed
to the piracy industry. Id.
108. Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 51, at 292.
109. New 7hreats, supra note 2, at 8.
110. Id
111. GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 50, at 47. Much of this attitude comes from work dating
back to the early 1960s and the emergence of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). UNCLAD, after studying the Kennedy Round, asserted that developing countries lack
the bargaining power to negotiate concessions of interest to them and that consequently their interests
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between industrialized countries and developing countries,
developing countries assert that they lack the bargaining power to
negotiate and that consequently their interests are not adequately
reflected in the results." '2 On the other hand, the variety of topics
involved in the Uruguay Round offer developing countries a variety
of meaningful negotiating tools.
Despite their reluctance to support intellectual property
protection in GATT, developing countries have the largest stake in
the future of the international trading system. Because their
economies depend greatly upon the openness on international
markets, these countries' overriding objective is to maintain and
strengthen the multilateral trading system.' Faced with
industrialized countries tending to pursue a protectionist strategy
when confronted with rapid shifts in comparative advantage,
especially in period of economic uncertainty, developing nations
have little choice but to participate in finding a GATT-intellectual
property protection solution." 4 Developing countries, which
prefer increased market access for their exports, must meet the
challenge of GATT negotiations." 5 The alternative is the "law
of the jungle" effect of unilateral and bilateral movements. 116
were not adequately reflected in the results. l
112. Around the time of the December 1990 meeting, criticism was voiced about the lack of
attention paid by industrialized countries to Third World Concerns. The non-governmental
organizations (NGO) from 27 countries denounced the manner in which negotiations have been
conducted, while attending the Uruguay Rounds in Brussels. The NGO spokesperson commented
that the trade talks did not deal with the effects of the "existing trading system on hunger, poverty,
external debt and underdevelopment." See Oppewal, GAM77 NGO's Make Demandsfor Change, Inter
Press Service, (LEXIS, Nexis file) Dec. 3, 1990. See also GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 50 at 47.
113. Koh, supra note 99, at 49.
114. Ricupero, Trade and Technology: Issues at Stake for Developing Countries, reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TEcHNOLOOY, TRADE POLicY AND
THE URUGUAY ROUND 187, 192 (1990).
115. See supra note 84. As noted above, the variety of topics involved in GATT Rounds, like
agriculture and textiles, do offer developing countries a variety of meaningful tools.
116. A statement made by U.S. trade representative, Carla Hills. Azocar, Inter Press Service,
Dec. 3, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis file).
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2. Developed Countries and GA7T - A Code Proposal
Many member nations strongly support the introduction of a
genuine Intellectual Property Protection-Code in GAT .11 7
Developed countries, especially, find it in their best interest to
create within the GATT framework a supplementary agreement
liberalizing trade in accordance with tighter trade rules than those
which would probably result in a GATT-wide resolution."' The
European Community, Japan, and the U.S. support such an
Intellectual Property Protection-Code.
The European, Japanese, and U.S. business communities created
their own memorandum in support of an Intellectual Property
Protection-Code. This joint memorandum contemplates protection
of patents, trademarks, designs, copyrights, semiconductor chip
layouts, and proprietary information.19 This statement prudently
addresses the proposed protection, its definition, accompanying
rights, terms, use and enforcement procedures as well as the
fundamental principle behind its inclusion.'" The European,
Japanese, and U.S. business communities set out three main
117. Ulrich, GAT Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development, in GATr OR
WIPO? NEw WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 127, 129
(Beier & Schricker ed. 1989).
The most far-reaching proposal is that of the USA (GATI-
Doc.MTN.GNG/NGI I/W/14) since it extends to all important intellectual property
rights, establishes a precise framework of protection more or less following the
domestic law of the US and provides for trade sanctions, i.e. for compensatory
and retaliatory withdrawal of trade concessions, imposition of tariffs and quota
etc., in case these standards are not met by signatories ...
Id
Japan's proposal (MTN.GNG/NG 1 1/W 17/Add I of 23 Sept. 1988) does not extend
to trade secrets and is framed rather vaguely so as to allow for further negotiation. EEC-
proposal of July 1988. (MTN.GNG/NG I 1/W/25 of July 1988) attempts to cover all
intellectual property rights, but would limit sanctions to "appropriate cases."
Id. at nn.2-3.
118. GATI' PLUS, supra note 78, at 6.
119. The communities' memorandum, Basic Framework of GA7T Provisions on Intellectual
Property, summarizes the inadequate and ineffective protections of intellectual property, explains why
the present international intellectual property regimes never intended to address these trade
distortions, and then analyzes how the proposed GAIT Provisions on Intellectual Property Provision
can serve as a multilateral vehicle to substantially reduce these trade distortions. See Statement of
Views, supra note 10, at 363.
120. Id. at 371-402.
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objectives: To create an expeditious enforcement procedure under
national intellectual property and trade laws so as to effectively
deter the abuse of intellectual property rights; to encourage the
adoption and implementation of adequate intellectual property laws;
and to avoid creating barriers to legitimate trade.' The
European, Japanese, and U.S. seek to achieve these main objectives
by:
First, in the event that an owner of intellectual property
rights in a signatory country is faced with an infringing
import, the owner would be able to'stop the infringing
import at the border of the signatory. Second, in the event
that an owner of an intellectual property right in a signatory
country is confronted with an infringing good that has been
produced or created locally or abroad, the owner would be
able to use judicial procedures to stop the infringement.
Third, where such owners are -unable to obtain redress
because of a failure of the signatory country to carry out its
obligations, their own government will be able to invoke the
dispute resolution mechanisms of the GATT IPP [Intellectual
Property Protection].'
The union of these three powerful communities is found to be quite
impressive. However, GATT members need to realize that a GATT
code may not be the most fulfilling solution to their intellectual
property protection problems.
IV. MAKING A SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION
A. Demanding More Than a Code
The emphasis on a GATT code assumes that the code would
facilitate negotiations and permit countries with a common interest
in eliminating trade distortions caused by inadequate and
ineffective intellectual property protection to enter expeditiously
121. Id. at 366.
122. Id
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into an agreement.123 However, member nations should be wary
of circumventing a GATT-wide result. After all, the hope of
finding a comprehensive solution that included all parties fostered
the new GATT focus on intellectual property protection. The
purpose of including intellectual property in GATT was not for
harmonized countries to establish a code merely in frustration of
the opposition. The rationale that a code format provides parties
with the opportunity to form a separate detailed agreement, even if
it does not apply to all GATT members, only perpetuates the real
problem at hand. It proves to exacerbate the allowance of unfair
intellectual property practices. A code creates the same situation
seen in the other conventions administered under WIPO: Allowing
non-subscribing countries to disregard the protection rules.
The new approach to international intellectual property
protection through GATT should not have the effect of aligning
only industrialized countries' levels of protection. The laws of these
countries are already similar, and bridging remaining differences
between them is within the framework of the WIPO conference on
world-wide harmonization. 24 The real and necessary purpose of
a new GATT resolution should be to include the developing
countries in the adherence to the standards of intellectual property
protection. In this respect the European, Japanese, and U.S.
proposals extend far beyond an attempt to overcome the deadlock
into which the revision of the Paris Convention has run. Their joint
proposal advances more than elementary adherence to minimum
standards of intellectual property, which in itself would be a big
step for some countries."z
B. Working Out a Real Solution
The industrialized countries have set forth a negotiating agenda
that depends for its true success on the participation of developing
countries in the final accords. Although ongoing trade liberalization
123. Id. at 365.
124. Ulrich, supra note 117, at 147.
125. Id.
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carries great economic importance to developing countries, such
developments do not erase the general mistrust of GATT
negotiations. Consequently, developing countries which will have
to forsake short-term economic costs of a "piracy"-based industry
should not be the only concession makers. Industrialized countries
must be willing to be flexible in order to meet the need of the
developing countries and to eliminate the "rich man's club"
perception. The developed countries, to persuade developing
countries to make these changes, must prove that they are making
equal, if not greater, concessions in the Uruguay Round. This may
require revision of some of the traditional negotiating methods of
GATT.
GATE, with its procedure of reciprocal bargaining and
concessions, is clearly unsatisfactory to developing countries which
constitute a majority of the GATE membership.12 6 Both
developed and developing countries should realize that the
traditional conduct of GATE negotiations in terms of multilateral
reciprocity is outdated. GATE should be seeking a mutually
advantageous balance of legal rights and obligations. A proper
consideration of the concerns and preoccupations of developed
countries, in terms of diminishing the frustrations of economic
return, and developing countries, in terms of their national interest
and developmental needs, is indispensable for further advancement
of the negotiating process.12 1
V. CONCLUSION
While developed countries battle to maintain their comparative
advantages and their prosperous economies, developing countries
continue their struggle to develop and secure open markets for their
exports. However, a growing appreciation that the patterns of
global trade are increasingly determined by the standards of
126. SIMMONDs & HILL, supra note 63, at 3-4.
127. Id. at 39.
128. Ricupero, Trade and Technology: Issues at Stake for Developing Countries, reprinted in
UNrrED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TECHNOLOGY, TRADE POLICY AND
THE URUGUAY ROuND 187, 197 (1990).
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intellectual property protection brings the developed and developing
countries worlds together. The focus on protection extends well
beyond the inefficiencies of intellectual property to the effects on
international trade flows. Developed countries claim that an
increase in protectionist measures are necessary to prevent others
from producing dubious products at cheaper prices and cheating
inventors and developers of their fair returns. These countries
blame the alleged trade unfairness on the inadequacies of
intellectual property protections.
Frustrated with attempts to improve municipal laws, customs
laws, and existing treaties like the Paris Convention, countries have
turned their efforts to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Since GATT is the international body of law that purportedly
guarantees fair and free trade for all signatories, countries welcome
GATT as a forum for a discussion on the elimination of distortion
in intellectual property trade. Although developing countries have
been reluctant to admit that intellectual property is a "good" so as
to deserve laws, many have now joined in the current GATT
endeavor after recognizing that the growing alternatives of
unilateral and bilateral actions leave them at a great disadvantage,
since they have a limited voice.
Thus, the challenge of the Uruguay Round has been to bring
together the forum and rules governing international trade under
GATT and the intellectual property norms that have evolved
through the series of international WIPO agreements. To reach a
successful solution, the efforts must also balance the needs and
considerations of both developed and developing countries. An
intellectual property agreement that fails to include all signatories
only perpetuates the existing problems of distorted trade. A full
agreement on an intellectual property proposal is necessary.
Achieving this requires a re-evaluation of the traditional
negotiating methods of GATT. Developing countries, already
entering GATT with great skepticism, need assurance that their
voices will be heard. New manners of negotiations and some
adjustments are necessary to gain their confidence in the system.
GATT members must work out a combination of trust and trade-
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offs if they intend to achieve a true solution, acceptable to all
signatories, to the trade-related problems of intellectual property.
Jean M. Dettmann
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